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This Choices theme is premised on an assumption that 
agriculture has entered a new era of increased instability. 
Among the causes posited for this increased instability are 
the recent integration of the agriculture and energy sectors 
through bioenergy markets and the macroeconomic con-
sequences of the current recession and credit crisis. While 
increased volatility in some agricultural commodity prices 
has been observed recently, whether agriculture has actu-
ally entered a new era of long-run increased instability is, 
we believe, open to some question. History is replete with 
“new eras” in American agriculture—most of which were 
amazingly short-lived (Paarlberg, 1964).
Regardless  of  what  has  changed,  much  remains  un-
changed. Agricultural production is still quite concentrated 
with less than 6% of the farms in the United States produc-
ing 75% of the value of production (Census of Agricul-
ture, 2007). Most U.S. farms still produce undifferentiated 
commodities for markets where production is character-
ized by relative ease of entry and exit. And farming is still 
a risky business.
When examining the risk in agriculture, a common 
pitfall is to focus strictly on the variability of annual farm 
net income or even the variability of net income from a 
specific commodity. While variability in annual net income 
can threaten the short-run survival of a farm business, it is 
also important to look more broadly to the variability of 
both annual net income and asset values from a portfolio 
perspective. An unreasonably narrow perception has con-
tributed to misunderstandings regarding the risk exposure 
in agriculture and federal policies that are redundant, too 
focused on single-year income streams, too commodity-
specific, and too likely to create significant resource misal-
location.
Portfolios and Risk
Farm households manage a portfolio of assets. Those assets 
are used in crop and/or livestock production and frequently 
also in enterprises that are related to farm production such 
as custom harvesting or initial processing of agricultural 
commodities. However, not all farm household assets are 
utilized in agricultural production or enterprises related to 
agricultural production. Like other U.S. households, farm 
households invest in financial or real assets that may be 
completely unrelated to agriculture.
Farms classified by ERS as large-scale family farms ac-
count for more than 60% of the value of agricultural pro-
duction in the United States. On approximately 50% of 
these farms the farm operator and/or the spouse work off 
the farm (Hoppe, Korb, O’Donoghue, and Banker, 2007). 
Table 1 indicates that, for large-scale family farms, both 
earned and unearned sources of off-farm income account 
for a significant share of total farm household income. 
Table 1. 




Mean household income $125,120  $272,527 
Farm earnings $80,250  $225,094	
Off-farm income $44,870	 $47,434	
Earned $33,238  $29,320 
Unearned $11,633  $18,114	
Share of income from off-farm 35.90% 17.40%
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Farm  households  manage  their 
portfolios  by  making  decisions  that 
weigh expected returns (either annual 
net income or capital gains) against 
risk exposure (often measured as the 
variability in returns). Like other in-
vestors, farm households desire high-
er expected returns but dislike risk. 
However, expected return and risk are 
usually positively correlated.
Farm portfolios may include only 
one crop or livestock commodity or 
may be diversified across several com-
modities. Specialization often creates 
economic  efficiencies  that  may  in-
crease net returns, but it also typically 
exposes the farm household to more 
risk. 
Farmers  have  always  been  faced 
with  variability  in  output  prices, 
yields, and input costs. For a single 
commodity,  this  variability,  along 
with  the  correlations  among  these 
random variables, has important im-
plications  for  variability  in  annual 
net income. Similarly, the variability 
in whole farm net income is affected 
by  cross-commodity  correlations  in 
these random variables. So an argu-
ment that agriculture is entering an 
era of increased instability in annual 
net income is implicitly an argument 
that the variability of the underlying 
random variables has increased and/
or that the correlations have changed.
But the risk exposure of a farm 
household portfolio is not limited to 
just variability in annual net income. 
Like any other investment portfolio, a 
major risk (and perhaps the most im-
portant risk) is variability in the value 
of  the  underlying  assets—capital 
gains and losses. For large-scale fam-
ily farms, 88% of net worth is tied to 
farm assets and approximately 68% 
of  farm  net  worth  is  in  real  estate 
(Hoppe,  Korb,  O’Donoghue,  and 
Banker, 2007). Thus, from a portfolio 
perspective, variability in land values 
may be far more significant than vari-
ability in annual net income caused 
by random output prices, yields, and 
input costs. For example, a 10% de-
crease in the value of cropland from a 
base value of $2,500 per acre reduces 
net worth by an amount that is equiv-
alent to a $1.25 per bushel decrease in 
the price of a 200 bushel per acre corn 
crop.  It  is  worth  remembering  that 
between 1981 and 1987 the value of 
farm assets in the United States de-
creased by 30%. In the Midwest, land 
values  fell  by  approximately  50% 
(Barnett, 2000).
Commodities
Despite  the  emphasis  in  recent  de-
cades  on  “value-added”  agriculture 
and farmers “moving down the sup-
ply chain,” much of U.S. agriculture 
is still based on producing undiffer-
entiated  commodities.  Further,  in 
some  regions  of  the  United  States, 
farmers  can  quickly  enter  and  exit 
specific commodity markets. The ease 
of  entry  and  exit  from  markets  for 
undifferentiated  commodities  sug-
gests that while price variability may 
create short-run economic profits or 
losses, these profits or losses are not 
likely to be sustained over the long 
run. Short-run economic profits will 
attract  new  entrants.  This  increases 
the cost of limiting resources (typi-
cally land) and drives out the short-
run economic profit. 
Available Risk Management Tools
Farm households use various methods 
to manage their risk exposure. They 
commonly diversify across commodi-
ties  or  geographic  locations.  Farm 
households also manage risk by pro-
ducing crops that generate multiple 
harvests over a single growing season, 
securing off-farm employment, or in-
vesting in off-farm assets. Other risk 
management strategies include using 
risk-reducing  inputs  such  as  irriga-
tion,  forward  pricing,  savings,  and 
maintaining credit reserves.
The  federal  government  also  di-
rectly provides, or subsidizes the pro-
vision of, a host of programs that pro-
vide  income  enhancement  and  risk 
management benefits to agricultural 
producers. Some of these are standing 
federal  programs  while  others  have 
been authorized on an ad hoc basis. 
Access  to  these  programs  is  gener-
ally limited to producers of selected 
crops. For example, standing federal 
commodity  programs  (see  table  2) 
are available only to producers of the 
major  program  crops  (barley,  corn, 
cotton, grain sorghum, oats, peanuts, 
rice, soybeans, wheat). Federally-sub-
sidized  yield  and/or  revenue  insur-
ance are available for more than 100 
crops produced in the United States. 
However, with the exception of pilot 
price insurance programs for swine, 
cattle, and lambs, livestock producers 
do not have access to federally-subsi-
dized insurance.
Through the years, various types 
of federal emergency assistance have 
been provided to both crop and live-
stock  producers  on  an  ad  hoc  basis 
to compensate for production losses, 
low output prices, or high input costs. 
However,  the  availability  of  such 
ad  hoc  assistance  is,  by  definition, 
Figure 1. Commodity Programs Under the 
2008 Farm Bill
Program crop producers must choose 









Marketing loan rates reduced by 30% 
relative to option 1.
Average	Crop	Revenue	Election	(ACRE)	
revenue counter-cyclical program.
For more information see  http://www.
ers.usda.gov/FarmBill/2008/Titles/TitleI-
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uncertain  and  often  comes  many 
months  after  the  loss  has  occurred. 
This  makes  it  effectively  impossible 
for farm households to include ad hoc 
assistance in risk management plan-
ning.
The 2008 Farm Bill created, for 
the first time since 1980, a standing 
federal  disaster  payment  program. 
Payments  from  the  Supplemental 
Revenue Assistance Program (SURE) 
are triggered by shortfalls in realized 
whole-farm (not commodity-specific) 
revenue.
The Adequacy of Current Federal 
Policies
Any  assessment  of  the  adequacy  of 
current  federal  risk  management 
(or  income  enhancement)  policies 
begs the question of “adequacy” for 
whom—for  program  crop  produc-
ers, the broader agricultural sector, or 
society as a whole? For example, bio-
fuels policies adopted in recent years 
have  benefitted  some  program  crop 
producers  but  have  negatively  im-
pacted livestock producers who often 
do not produce feed crops. 
Policymakers are generally averse 
to radical changes. Thus, federal ag-
ricultural policies have changed only 
incrementally  over  time.  Today’s 
hodgepodge  of  government  com-
modity  programs  and  subsidized 
insurance programs are, in part, a re-
sponse to the current political climate 
and, in part, a historical artifact. It is 
hard to imagine that anyone working 
from a clean slate would conceive of 
such a mix of overlapping, and some-
times conflicting, programs.  
As an example of federal program 
redundancy, consider that the market-
ing loan provides program crop pro-
ducers with protection against output 
price risk. Additional price or revenue 
risk  protection  is  provided  through 
the producer’s choice of participating 
in  either  the  price  counter-cyclical 
payment program (assuming the pro-
ducer actually produces the crop on 
which  the  counter-cyclical  payment 
will be made) or the Average Crop 
Revenue Election (ACRE) program. 
The SURE program provides further 
protection against revenue shortfalls, 
and  federally-subsidized  revenue  in-
surance is also available. So program 
crop  producers  can  potentially  re-
ceive compensation triggered by low 
prices from up to four different feder-
ally provided or subsidized programs. 
Coble and Barnett (2008) show that 
greater risk reduction per federal dol-
lar spent could be obtained from sim-
pler nonredundant programs.
In contrast, to the many federal 
programs that protect program crop 
producers against output price risk, 
the  SURE  program  and  subsidized 
yield  or  revenue  insurance  are  the 
only standing federal programs from 
which producers can potentially re-
ceive  compensation  triggered  by 
production  shortfalls.  There  are  no 
standing federal programs that pro-
tect  crop  producers  against  rapidly 
escalating input costs.
It is also important to note that 
neither  the  private  sector  nor  the 
public  sector  provide  protection 
against  fluctuations  in  land  values. 
Among the reasons for this are spa-
tial differences in land attributes, the 
likelihood that the owner has access 
to proprietary information about the 
attributes  of  any  particular  parcel, 
and the fact that land value risk is an 
example of what Skees and Barnett 
(1999)  call  an  “in-between”  risk—
neither  highly  systemic  (so  that  it 
might be appropriate for futures mar-
kets) nor highly idiosyncratic (so that 
it might be appropriate for insurance 
markets). 
Long Run versus Short Run
Agricultural  production  requires 
long-run commitments (e.g., invest-
ments  in  land  or  equipment)  but 
markets  typically  offer  only  limited 
opportunities for obtaining risk pro-
tection that extends beyond a single 
production  season.  While  many 
farmers can forward price their out-
puts and at least some of their inputs 
within  a  production  season,  most 
output  handlers  or  input  suppliers 
will not offer forward contracts be-
yond the current production season. 
For some major crops, futures con-
tracts  are  available  for  at  least  one 
growing season into the future, but 
the markets for these contracts tend 
to be very thin and highly volatile.
From a producer’s perspective, a 
primary  advantage  of  federally  pro-
vided or subsidized risk management 
programs is that they provide longer-
run protection than is available from 
markets. The federal marketing loan 
program  and  price  counter-cyclical 
payment  program  trigger  payments 
whenever realized prices are less than 
targets that are prespecified through-
out  the  life  of  the  farm  bill.  The 
revenue  targets  for  ACRE—and  to 
some  degree  for  SURE—are  based 
on moving averages of historical rev-
enues. For ACRE the revenue targets 
cannot increase or decrease by more 
than  10%  per  year.  The  federally-
subsidized  yield  and  revenue  insur-
ance  programs  also  establish  targets 
based on historical moving averages 
of yield.
While the longer-run protection 
available from federally provided or 
subsidized  risk  management  pro-
grams is an advantage to producers, it 
likely imposes significant social costs. 
Long-run price or revenue guarantees 
can distort market price signals and 
lead to the misallocation of resources.
The benefits of federal commodity 
programs are also bid into land values. 
Since land is a primary store of wealth 
for many farm households, the po-
tential for changes in federal policies 
is likely one of the most important 
risks currently facing many U.S. farm 
households. In this period of record 
budget deficits, any effort to reduce 
federal outlays for agricultural com-
modity  programs  or  corn/soybean 
based bioenergy programs is likely to 
cause  tremendous  capital  losses  for 	 1st	Quarter	2009	•	24(1)	 CHOICES  39
many  farm  households.  Further,  as 
the economy recovers from the cur-
rent recession, the Federal Reserve is 
likely to raise interest rates to forestall 
inflationary pressures. This will also 
create  downward  pressure  on  land 
values.
A New Era of Instability?
Has U.S. agriculture entered a new 
era of instability? Perhaps. It is too 
early to tell if the long-run variabil-
ity of output prices or input costs has 
increased. For some commodities, it 
seems  likely  that  the  integration  of 
agricultural and energy markets has 
changed correlations among random 
variables (e.g., output prices and in-
put  costs)  that  affect  the  variability 
of  annual  net  income,  though  the 
magnitude of those changes is not yet 
clear. For other commodities, there is 
likely little or no impact.
Regardless, much is likely to re-
main  unchanged  in  this  “new  era.” 
For the foreseeable future, most U.S. 
agricultural producers will still pro-
duce  undifferentiated  commodities 
(that are also produced in many other 
countries around the world) for mar-
kets that are characterized by relative 
ease of entry and exit. This implies 
that  any  period  of  unusually  high 
profit  for  producers  of  agricultural 
commodities  is  likely  to  be  short-
lived. 
Markets will continue to offer an 
array of mechanisms that producers 
can use to forward price their com-
modities within a production season. 
Due  to  the  potential  for  supply  or 
demand shocks that cause unforeseen 
but systemic changes in price, markets 
are unlikely to provide risk manage-
ment tools for output prices or input 
costs that extend much beyond a pro-
duction season. Any longer-run price 
or revenue protection will have to be 
provided by the federal government. 
However,  efforts  to  provide  longer-
run agricultural risk management (or 
income enhancement) programs will 
conflict with concerns about resource 
misallocation (and the potential for 
associated  environmental  impacts) 
as well as U.S. trade obligations that 
extend  well  beyond  the  agricultural 
sector. 
Due to efficiencies from special-
ization, farms are unlikely to revert to 
the highly diversified multicommod-
ity enterprises of yesteryear. But farm 
households will continue to diversify 
their portfolios through off-farm em-
ployment and off-farm investments. 
In many rural areas the opportunities 
for off-farm employment have never 
been  greater  (the  current  recession 
aside)  while  modern  financial  mar-
kets make it possible for agricultural 
producers  to  hold  a  well-diversified 
portfolio  of  investments  that  are 
largely uncorrelated with the net re-
turns from producing farm commod-
ities.  As  with  any  other  household, 
accumulating savings and maintain-
ing credit reserves will also be an im-
portant risk management strategy.
The federal measures that enhance 
farm incomes and reduce the variabil-
ity in single-year income streams may 
actually  increase  the  risk  inherent 
in many farm household portfolios. 
The  benefits  of  these  programs  are 
bid into land values. Thus, the accu-
mulated wealth of many farm house-
holds is highly vulnerable to reduc-
tions  in  federal  transfers—as  might 
be  required  to  meet  future  federal 
budget cuts or trade agreement com-
mitments.  Further,  farmland  values 
are also vulnerable to higher interest 
rates, and that seems quite likely fol-
lowing on the heels of the current fis-
cal stimulus.
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